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I.  INTRODUCTION 
We understand that both the level as well as the composition of investment 
play a crucial role in the economic development process. However, it needs to be 
understood that investment contributes to the growth process by increasing the 
productive capacity, improving the technology, and enhancing the competitiveness 
of an economy.  And when it is supplemented with investment in the social sectors, it 
also results in human development. The demand for investment depends on strong 
macroeconomic fundamentals comprising stability of exchange rates, fiscal 
prudence, feasible structure of financial market, including the regulatory and 
supervisory framework and the size and quality of the securities and bond markets, 
and continuity of a consistent investment policy.
1  
Two types of capital formation may be distinguished, viz., physical capital 
and human capital.  Since there are significant differences between private and social 
profitabilities in the social sectors, an optimal level of investment in human resources 
would depend on the perception of and the decisions taken by the policy-makers to 
bridge the gap between the two types of profitabilities. Nevertheless, implementation 
of an investment decision, whether related to physical or social investment, is 
contingent on the availability of sufficient domestic and external investible 
resources. The former comprise voluntary and involuntary household savings, 
corporate savings, and government savings, and are influenced by a number of 
factors including the level and growth of per capita incomes, time preferences of 
individuals in the society, financial intermediation, demographic structure, fiscal 
policy, etc. The foreign investible resources comprising the overseas development 
assistance and foreign private direct and portfolio investments are influenced by a 
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host of factors, most important of which are the strong fundamentals of the economy. 
The investment in human resources depends on the ability of the government to raise 
sufficient tax revenues, and on the possibility of domestic and foreign borrowing 
without affecting the economy adversely.  
How these processes can be worked favourably in a developing country is my 
main focus today. After this introductory section, financing of public investments is 
examined in Section II. The determinants of private savings are analysed in Section 
III. Foreign capital investment flows, their determinants and prospects for 
developing economies, are discussed in Section IV. When to open the capital 
accounts, and their impact on the economy if they are prematurely opened, is 
analysed in Section V. The need and desirability of financial assistance is reviewed 
in Section VI, and debt restructuring is examined in Section VII. The institutional 
framework for proper resource mobilisation is discussed in Section VIII. The 
concluding section of the paper draws out implications of the analysis for resource 
mobilisation in Pakistan.  
 
II.  FINANCING OF PUBLIC INVESTMENTS 
We know that government needs public revenues to finance both current as 
well as development expenditures. While there is hardly any justification of public 
sector intervention in commercial activities where there is no danger of private 
monopolies, there is little possibility that private sector would invest in such social 
sector projects where financial rates of return are low. Nevertheless, all such projects 
that have high economic rates of return need to be taken up for the welfare of the 
common man even if the financial rates of return are low. Such projects can be 
initiated only in the public sector, unless the private sector is subsidised. The fiscal 
system, therefore, has to generate sufficient public revenues to finance such projects. 
Alternatively, these may be financed by domestic borrowing or through Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). Let us first discuss the domestic resource 
mobilisation for public sector development. 
Fiscal policy can help increase corporate savings by reducing the disposable 
incomes of individuals, discouraging private consumption, and creating incentives 
for the retention of profits [see Islam (2000)]. While a higher level of taxation would 
tend to increase public savings, its impact on aggregate savings is not unambiguous. 
It may substitute the private sector savings. Similarly, taxing consumption results in 
a higher level of savings, but such a tax in general is regressive, violating the norms 
of equity.
2 Accordingly, such tax structure needs to be designed as would provide 
sufficient resources for the current and development expenditures but does not result 
in lower private savings or a violation of the norms of equity. 
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Public revenue in South Asia is around 15 percent, and the tax revenue only 
10 percent of GDP. One of the main reasons for the low level of public revenue has 
been the heavy reliance on trade-related taxes at least initially. The pursuance of 
import substitution policies led to the loss of revenue from import duties and, 
because the domestic taxes did not rise sufficiently, to the decline in public revenues. 
Since expenditures continued to rise, the government savings in South Asia have 
been negative. They were –3.6, –3.7, and –2.7 percent of GDP in India, Pakistan, and 
Sri Lanka, respectively in the late 1990s. 
Value-added tax (VAT) for revenues, import duties for protective and 
personal income, and corporate income tax for equity may be the optimal tax 
assignments. VAT is a broad-based tax and can yield higher revenues depending on 
the design and effectiveness with which it is enforced. Tariffs have been the major 
source of revenue at least in the initial stages. A high rate of trade taxes and 
dispersion, resulting in a high level of and dispersion in the effective protection rates, 
lead to production inefficiencies and create anti-export bias. Accordingly, tariffs 
have been rationalised and this has resulted in major revenue losses. 
It is argued that income tax rates may be reduced, as it would result in 
improvement in compliance, lighten the tax administration, and promote labour 
supply and savings.
3 It is also justified on the ground that high statutory rates with 
exemptions distort the system and promote rent-seeking behaviour. This undermines 
the perception of fairness and results in a complex system and misallocation of 
resources. While such distortions must be removed, reduction in income tax rates is 
inequitable because the taxes, which will be imposed to protect revenue, will hit the 
poor.  
The net effect of a tax change on total savings depends, on the one hand, on 
the relative marginal propensities of different groups to save and, on the other hand, 
on an increase in public investment or reduction in fiscal deficit. Obviously, if the 
reduction in private savings exceeds the increase in public savings, the aggregate 
savings would fall. It may help public investment but may crowed out private 
investment. 
The cross-country regression across countries over the 1975-95 period shows 
that direct taxes are negatively associated with household savings, though the 
elasticity is only 0.09. Indirect taxes have no impact on the household savings 
behaviour. The panel data also show the same result, and although the elasticity rises 
to 0.16, yet it still is quite low [see Callan and Thimann (1997)]. 
Cross-country studies indicate that capital and labour taxes depress economic 
activity in the long run. An increase in the proportional capital tax reduces savings 
and discourages capital formation. Labour tax reduces capital formation provided 
labour supply is endogenous [see Heijdra and Ligthart (1998)]. Consumption taxes, 
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on the other hand, tend to increase capital stock in the long run, provided the inter-
generational effect dominates the labour supply effect. 
Public investment may also be financed by borrowing if sufficient revenues 
are not available to meet such expenditures. However, its impact on savings needs to 
be examined carefully. This is because it can result in inflation and destabilise the 
economy, leading to lower private savings [see Fry (1991)].  However, when there is 
slack in the economy, increase in public investment would tend to increase the 
incomes and savings.  
 
III.  DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE SAVINGS 
 
Household Savings 
Two types of household savings, i.e., voluntary and compulsory, may be 
distinguished. The levels and sustainability of per capita income, openness of 
international trade, financial and capital market structure, pension and provident 
funds, the taxation structure, demographic transition, freedom of foreign capital 
transactions, and competition in domestic market have a positive and significant 
impact on the household savings rate. High and sustained growth in per capita 
income tends to increase the saving rates; once growth rates start increasing, they are 
self-sustaining. However, fiscal stimulus can help increase the savings rate, if the 
growth rates are constrained because of the lack of effective demand resulting in idle 
capacity.  
 
Voluntary Household Savings 
Various cross-country and time-series and cross-section studies on savings 
behaviour indicate that real GDP and real deposit rates have a positive impact and 
fiscal deficit and foreign and domestic debt have a negative impact on savings. The 
public policies that keep down the inflation rate, reduce uncertainties, and promote 
financial deepening also have a positive impact on savings [For example, see 
Hadjimichael and Ghura (1995) and Barro (1989)]. 
The demographic transition may also raise the rate of savings by reducing the 
household size. Cross-country data show that the rate of growth of population and 
the share of population below 15 years of age have a negative impact on the savings 
rate [see Manzocchi (1999)]. The evidence from South-East Asian countries 
indicates that a reduction in the population growth rate reduces the young depending 
cohort percentages and increases the savings rate. At the same time, as the proportion 
of the elderly increases, it can have a negative impact. The net effect on per capita 
savings depends on initial conditions such as the share of individual cohorts in the 
total population and the rate of growth of the labour force. As long as the old cohort 
does not fully dis-save its wealth, and partially transfers it to dependent youth, a fall 
in the population growth rate necessarily raises the savings rate.       Financing Economic Development  297
Whereas the individual’s time preference is an important determinant of 
savings, it is influenced by the well-functioning financial markets.
4 Financial 
repression forces financial institutions to pay low and often negative real interest 
rates, and it results in the reduction of household savings [see McKinnon (1973); 
Shaw (1973); Demiriuc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998)]. High level of non-performing 
loans reduces the confidence of potential depositors in the ability of banks to repay 
their deposits, thus inducing a lower supply of funds to the financial sector. Large 
share of bad loans in the portfolio also induces banks to widen the spread between 
borrowing and lending interest rates. High inflationary expectations and unstable 
macroeconomic environment also creates uncertainty in the system. The countries 
that had experienced significant banking sector problems recorded a fiscal cost up to 
20 percent of GDP [see Lindgren et al. (1996); Bandiera et al. (1999)]. 
Reforms in the financial sector can increase the savings rate significantly. 
Financial sector development can help, for example, in mobilisation of domestic 
resources by facilitating transactions among individuals and enterprises, providing 
convenient methods of payment, cost-effective mechanisms for transferring savings 
from surplus sectors on the basis of profitability and risk assessments, and offering a 
wider choice of modes of savings with various liquidity and risk profiles. An 
increase in investment efficiency, resulting from information advantage held by 
banks in dealing with borrowers, as well as their ability to pool risks and lower costs 
of financial intermediation, induce a higher expected return for savers at any level of 
risk, leading to higher savings.  
Financial repression is a stumbling block to resource mobilisation and its 
removal is expected to improve the rate of return to the households. However, the 
evidence on sensitivity of savings to interest rate is mixed [see Ogaki, Ostry and 
Reinhart (1995)]. It is generally found that sensitivity of savings to interest rates is a 
rising function of the income levels. For the very poor developing countries it is 
rather low, i.e., only 0.18; and in most of these countries it is not even statistically 
significant. However, interest sensitivity for middle- and high-income groups is 
relatively much higher; for lower middle-income group, it is 0.55; for upper middle-
income group, it is 0.58; and for very high-income countries, it is 0.60. This indicates 
a statistically significant though small positive effect of the real interest rate on 
national savings ratio
5 [see Ogaki, Ostry and Reinhart (1995)]. 
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A positive impact of financial development on real per capita income growth 
and productivity has been found in a number of studies. A robust positive 
econometric relationship has been found between the banking sector development 
and private savings rate [Beck, Ross and Loayza (1999)].  Financial deregulation, on 
the other hand, does not necessarily lead to higher savings, especially in the short 
run.  While some countries show positive results, a negative association has been 
observed especially in the short run. The decline in the savings rate in the short run 
in most of the countries has been around 2-percentage point [Bayoumi (1993)]. 
Nevertheless, over long run, most of the losses are recouped. It is, therefore, safe to 
conclude that interest rate deregulation is not the panacea.  
In view of this, there is an urgent need for reforms in the following three key 
areas. First, the establishment of an appropriate institutional setting and financial 
infrastructure as the basis for a sound credit culture and an effective functioning of 
financial markets.  Secondly, the proper functioning of markets, so that owners and 
other stakeholders in financial institutions have a strong incentive to exercise 
adequate discipline. Third, the creation of regulatory and supervisory arrangements 
that complement and support the operation of market discipline.  
The stock markets have assumed an increasing role as a means to mobilising 
domestic resources and providing a wider range of financial services. This has been 
facilitated by the deregulation and liberalisation measures, as well as by specific 
policies to foster the development of stock markets [ESCAP (1995)]. With a view to 
ensuring that individuals invest in stock markets, the regulatory framework must be 
efficient and independent. The confidence of the investors needs to be established by 
curbing insider trading and speculation.  Developing independent domestic credit 
rating agencies would help a great deal in this direction.  
Equity markets provide both an alternative to bank financing and a means to 
exercise market discipline over bank managements. The ratio of stock market 
capitalisation to GDP is correlated with several economic determinants that can be 
influenced by economic policies, suggesting that, over time, public policy can help 
fill the gaps in the financial market structure.   
The breadth and the depth of capital markets can widen the availability of 
finance to corporate bodies through new instruments, e.g., bonds, and retail savings 
instruments. However, the existing small markets are vulnerable to speculative runs 
and other forms of manipulation. When currency markets are too thin and shallow, 
there can be speculative attacks. Hedging instruments may be used to avoid the 
losses arising from exchange movements; market-based flexible exchange rates have 
added new risks of unexpected exchange rate movements and significantly increased 
the need to hedge currencies and prices. With a view to ensuring that hedging 
instruments are effective and not another source of speculative activity, it is 
necessary that the markets where they are traded are deep and the price discovery 
process robust. Since a large number of investors may not know of the currency Financing Economic Development  299
hedging, there is a need to increase awareness and technical training. Speculative 
attacks or any other type of manipulations may be stopped by regulation to ensure 
disclosure, transparency, and better accounting and auditing practices.   
 
Involuntary Household Savings 
Involuntary savings may be promoted through mandatory provident funds and 
fully funded pension schemes. These have been employed very effectively in Japan, 
Malaysia, and Singapore. They have the potential to raise the savings rate upto 3-4 
percent of GDP and ensure cash flow, change the short-term liability to a long-term 
liability, and are an ideal source of term finance for both private and public sectors 
[DRI/McGraw Hill (1998)]. However, the impact of such schemes on aggregate 
savings depends on the extent to which they substitute the voluntary savings.   
Econometric evidence on Singapore’s fully funded Central Provident Fund shows 
that it has stimulated aggregate savings, and similar results have been obtained for 
Chile, though with a considerable time lag.  Nevertheless, it will have a significant 
impact only in those countries that have a large organised production, especially the 
corporate sector. 
Pension funds add to the institutional investor pool for domestic capital 
markets.  While pension funds potentially could be quite large, it is not all that easy 
to start new funds, and they may not have sufficient finances initially. It may not be 
feasible to organise pension funds on a sustainable basis for the informal or 
unregistered sector. Moreover, because of unscrupulous brokers, these lack 
credibility. And it is rather difficult to supervise brokers except through a viable 
national association of dealers. Life insurance, unemployment insurance, and other 
forms of insurance in the developing economies exist mainly in the government 
sector and in the formal sectors of the economy. The coverage varies from country to 
country; it is higher in the countries with a large organised sector. 
 
Corporate Savings  
Corporate savings have been an important component of the aggregate savings 
rate, e.g., in Taiwan, where it accounts for almost one-quarter of the total savings. 
Corporate savings depend on profitability on the one hand, and dividend and 
retention policies of the firms on the other hand. Profitability of corporations is basic 
to the corporate savings rates. This calls for an improvement in the productivity of 
the corporate sector. While tariff rationalisation is expected to result in higher levels 
of efficiency, it does not necessarily result in a higher level of profits at least in the 
short run.
6  On the other hand privatisation in a competitive market structure is 
expected to result in higher levels of both efficiency and profitability, and 
consequently higher corporate savings.  
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Fiscal measures can be used to encourage corporate retention. The tax 
structure that creates incentives to retain profits may result in a higher level of 
corporate savings. The structure of ownership can be important and may insulate 
corporations from the pressure for greater dividend distribution.  
 
IV.   FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENTS 
Foreign capital flows take different forms: official development assistance 
(ODA), private short- and medium-term lending, foreign direct investment, and 
portfolio investment. While ODA in the past constituted the major flows across the 
country, the pattern of flows has changed over time. The concessional official flows 
have fallen and private flows based on profitability consideration have increased.  
Whether foreign capital would help in increasing the investment level depends 
on the usage of aid [see Calvo and Reinhart (1996); Manzocchi (1999) and Mapalad 
(1998)]. On average, 60 percent of the aid was used for investment and the 
remaining 40 percent for reduction in taxes or reduction in domestic borrowing. 
Even in the case where the financial institutions substantially increase their aid 
flows, the impact of financial liberalisation on government investment depends on 
the way in which the aid is spent.  
Foreign private investment flow not only provides additional resources, it also 
brings along a range of dynamic benefits including the transfer of technology, 
improved management practices, market access, competition, lower capital cost, and 
building the market confidence. While both FDI as well as portfolio investments add to 
the investible resources, it is generally presumed that portfolio investments are less 
useful than FDI. However, capital flows characterised by a high level of foreign direct 
investment and a low level of portfolio flows are not necessarily optimal; it depends on 
whether or not the capital flows are permanent and benefit the economy over the long 
run [Lopez-Mejia (1999)].  If FDI is driven by distorted incentives, it may be welfare-
reducing, especially if it is concentrated in the highly protected economic activities.  As 
debt services and investors’ remittances start to pick up, non-exporting foreign projects 
severely constrain the balance of payments. Accordingly, there is a need to ensure that 
foreign private capital flow into the foreign exchange earning sectors. In view of the 
limited capability of low-income developing countries to service their foreign debt and 
investment, FDI should flow towards export-oriented manufacturing, tourism, and 
activities directly supporting the export sectors.  
The risks and the costs associated with private capital flows are closely related 
to management issues. Prudent management by the financial authorities can 
minimise those risks and costs considerably. Accordingly, the magnitude, 
productivity, and volatility of different kinds of foreign capital need to be monitored 
closely. It must be underscored that it was the lack of portfolio management that led 
to the maturity mismatch and serious currency crisis in East and South East Asia. 
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borrowing, equity investment, bond investment, and FDI, must be maintained and 
monitored.  
The FDI may be both a substitute and a complement to domestic investment. 
It substitutes the domestic investment where plenty of domestic firms exist. 
Sometimes, it is suggested that any foreign private investment should be encouraged 
because of the existence of backward and forward linkages. However, FDI is not 
sufficient for crowding in the investment.  Panel data for 32 countries over the 1970-
1996 period does not show unambiguous results; in some South and South-East 
Asian countries FDI has crowded out the domestic investment, and in some others it 
has crowded in domestic investment.  
While the world Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) exceeded $ 800 billion in 
1998-99, in the developing world it was around $ 208 billion, and South Asian countries 
had a capital inflow of only $ 3 billion. The factors responsible for low levels of FDI 
include investment restrictions, ambivalent attitude towards foreign investment, 
inconsistent policies, poor law and order situation, and the threat perception increasing 
further after the nuclear explosions. The region has considerable potential but its 
realisation will depend on the pace of liberalisation and economic reform, and on 
domestic and regional stability. 
Developing countries can benefit from the growing pool of global capital to 
supplement domestic resources. Besides, the indirect benefits of foreign capital 
inflow include knowledge, spillover effects, improved resource allocation, 
strengthening of domestic financial markets, and a shift to higher returns on 
investments. The simulation exercises show that foreign investment can have large 
gains. The dynamic gains range between three to fifteen percent of GDP. The 
domestic firms that provide intermediate services have shown improvements in 
productivity [World Bank (1997)]. 
 Countries with the strongest fundamentals, such as a high investment-to-GDP 
ratio, low inflation and low real exchange rate variability, openness of the economy, 
health of domestic banks, flexibility of fiscal policy, good state of public finance, fair 
size and quality of domestic bond market, and the quality of regulatory and 
supervisory framework over the financial sector, are expected to receive the largest 
flows as percentage of GDP [Goldstein (1995)].  We may note that long-term 
inflows react to long-run fundamentals like investment and external debt-to-GDP 
ratio and are not sensitive to short-run arbitrage condition. The short-term flows, on 
the other hand, are quite different and basically respond to financial liberalisation 
and capital accounts.  
Developing economies may also leverage additional private sources of 
finance.  For example, multilateral financing agencies may join hands with the 
private sector and provide joint financing and increase the leverage to help countries 
and firms to tap international capital in a variety of forms. Similarly, development of 
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shares on the regional markets, and structured finance and securitisation offer new 
opportunities for developing countries.  
Offshore funds have greater flexibility and less procedural delays in changing 
the nature, structure or operation of their product, and they face fewer investment 
restrictions, short-term trading limitations, and capital structure requirements [Kim 
and Wei (1999)].  However, such funds can create or fuel a financial crisis because 
they engage in positive feedback trading
7 and are eager to mimic each other’s 
behaviour, ignoring the fundamentals of the economy. In the presence of noise 
traders, even rational investors may engage in positive feedback trading and 
destabilise the market.  
Divestiture of public enterprises may also help in raising foreign resources. 
However, while divesting, it needs to be ensured that the action results in higher 
levels of investment over the long run. With a view to maximising the price of the 
assets, it is advisable to restructure these enterprises and make them profitable before 
offering them for sale. Decisions such as labour shedding and changes in the price of 
the output should be taken prior to divestiture to maximise the value of assets. At the 
same time, higher prices are expected for the assets in countries that have strong 
fundamentals, a rationalised tariff structure, credible capital accounts, proper 
regulatory authority, and a history of continuity of the policies within a good 
governance structure.  
Infrastructures development through private funds, especially foreign funds, 
can play a crucial role in increasing the investible resources. This would be helped 
by an increase in the internal generation, which is achievable by improving the 
efficiency of the operational entities and developing the capital markets. Legislation 
and implementation of the relevant laws and regulations, as well as simplification of 
procedures, would also go a long way towards promoting private funds. Further 
development of bond markets and deregulation of investment in contractual savings 
instruments, such as insurance and pension funds, would help in long-term 
generation of foreign funds. Furthermore, uses of different variants of “build, own, 
operate, and transfer” (BOOT) can be effective in raising international funds; but 
there must be caution that such investments do not generate into government-ensured 
high returns to capital. 
 
V.  OPENING OF CAPITAL ACCOUNTS 
The degree of capital account liberalisation and financial deregulation 
determine the potential gains and benefits to be had from access to foreign financial 
services. No doubt, the likelihood of a banking crisis increases after financial 
liberalisation but this happens only in a weak institutional environment characterised 
by poor rule of law, widespread corruption, inefficient bureaucracy, and ineffective 
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contract enforcement mechanisms [Demiriuc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998)]. If 
liberalisation takes place without a well-developed inter-bank market, banks would 
find it difficult to deal with temporary liquidity shortages and their spread to other 
banks would create a panic. Empirical evidence suggests that the limited openness 
has been rather costly as there is a higher cost of financial services, slower 
institutional development, and fragile financial system [Mishin (1999)]. 
The developing countries must not liberalise capital accounts until they put in 
place an effective regulatory and supervisory regime. The positive effect of 
liberalisation on financial development may be stronger than the negative effect of a 
banking crisis in countries that were initially in a state of financial repression. 
However, in the presence of imperfect information, free capital mobility is likely to 
amplify existing distortions, create situations of moral hazard, encourage excessive 
risk-taking, and generate major and costly crises.   
Capital inflows have two major effects on the domestic banking system. First, 
the quasi-fiscal deficit increases as a result of the sterilisation policy that sells high-
yielding domestic bonds and buys foreign exchange, earning lower interest rates.  
Second, the financial system might become more vulnerable because of a rise in 
lending that may exacerbate the maturity mismatch between bank assets and 
liabilities and reduce loan quality. Resultantly, the financial sector becomes more 
vulnerable, especially by a surge in asset prices that is unsustainable.  Moreover, 
with increased capital mobility, the external counterpart of money supply may 
become more volatile, and the demand for domestically defined monetary aggregates 
may become more sensitive to international interest rate differentials, thus making it 
more difficult to identify a stable domestic monetary aggregate. 
A statistically significant impact of open capital accounts on financial 
deepness and economic growth has been observed in a cross-section of developed 
and developing countries over the period 1986 to 1995 [Klein and Olivei (1999)].  
Countries with open capital accounts enjoyed a significantly greater increase in 
financial depth than countries with continuing capital accounts restrictions. After 
liberalisation, even financially repressed economies tend to have improved financial 
development even if they experience a banking crisis. 
When international capital movements are eased, banks may start taking 
foreign exchange risk, i.e., raising funds in foreign currency on international markets 
and lending to the local borrowers.  Prudential limits on foreign currency exposure 
are circumvented in various ways and currency risk is transformed into credit risk by 
lending in foreign currency to unhedged domestic borrowers. As the skills to screen 
and monitor risky borrowers, manage the risky loan portfolios, and effecting efficient 
supervision can only be acquired through learning-by-doing, the developing 
countries’ banks would continue to be more vulnerable. 
Capital mobility may be politically unsustainable even if it enhances 
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other limitations, like the differences in legal systems, language or cultural habits, 
and technological levels.  Thus, for smooth and uninterrupted capital mobility, 
international fiscal coordination may be necessary. 
With a view to avoiding financial instability, capital controls are suggested. 
These may be classified into controls on capital outflows and controls on capital 
inflows [Gregorio, Edwards and Valdes (2000); Edwards (1999, 1999a); Tobin 
(1985)]. The controls on outflows, however, have been largely ineffective; they are 
easily circumvented, encourage corruption, and have never helped the adjustment 
process.  Moreover, the controls on outflows are generally not a temporary device; 
instead, they become a permanent feature of the country’s incentive structure. 
Control on short-term capital inflows would rule out the speculative activity, and 
Chile’s experience between 1991 and 1998 is seen as a successful example of this 
policy. 
Imposing tax on foreign capital may restrict capital flows. It may be argued 
that a global tax on foreign exchange transactions would reduce destabilising 
speculation in international financial markets but it will be effective only if all the 
countries tax such transactions simultaneously. Since it penalises short-term credit, 
the yield curve tends to be inverted. Small firms, which cannot issue long-term bonds 
in international capital markets, have to borrow at a differential interest rate higher 
than similar firms in other countries.  In other words, there is a bias against firms that 
cannot borrow for long, which are usually small businesses and firms that are 
starting operations. Instead of taxes on capital, liquidity requirement of the banking 
system is the alternative way to reduce vulnerability caused by short-term flows.  
The restrictions on foreign capital are being suggested because the country 
may become insolvent. It may be argued that as long as the intertemporal budget 
constraint is satisfied, the foreigners would be willing to lend. The solvency 
condition states that the present discounted value of future balance of trade surpluses 
must equal the present level of net external liabilities. Intertemporal solvency 
imposes too few restrictions on the path of the current account and external debt to 
provide a reliable guide to policy-makers concerning potential problems with a 
country’s external position [Milesi-Ferrett and Razin (1996)]. Even in the presence 
of intertemporal solvency, the questions about the sustainability of current account 
imbalances may arise if lenders have doubts about the borrowing country’s 
continued credit-worthiness. 
 
VI.  OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) 
In spite of growth in foreign private investment, there are at least three reasons 
for continuation of ODA. First, the poor countries do not have strong fundamentals, 
and, therefore private capital may not flow to such countries. Second, all such 
activities where the financial rate of return is not high, the private sector may not 
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distortions in the system, and as they would not be able to open their capital 
accounts, investment would not be forthcoming.   
ODA has been the traditional source of capital flows but its significance has 
declined in recent years.  The developing economies have received only $ 20 billion 
of ODA as compared to $ 208 of the foreign capital private flows.  The success to 
raise ODA depends on a favourable external environment in an interdependent 
world, and as such there is a need for consistency and coherence in the approaches to 
development between the donor and the recipient countries, and among international 
institutions, in support of quality development. The need to reinvigorate support for 
ODA in donor countries cannot be over-emphasised. And ensuring proper utilisation 
of foreign aid in macroeconomic governance plus a visible commitment to poverty 
reduction on the part of the recipient countries can go a long way in that direction.  
Accordingly, there is a need to streamline aid delivery and improve the quality of 
aid. This would involve more expeditious disbursement, better understanding of the 
priorities between the donors and the recipients, with due respect for the opinion of 
the recipient countries, and appropriate measures to ensure availability of counterpart 
funds.  
ODA quantity should be increased as nearly half of the world’s population 
still lives in poverty and the developed countries have committed to devote 0.7 
percent of their GNP as ODA. Nevertheless, it should have a clear focus on social 
sectors including, in particular, human resources development and physical 
infrastructure development, which have a direct impact on poverty alleviation. New 
modalities for the delivery of ODA could include support for public/private 
partnerships to facilitate trade and investment.  
There is also a need for further improvements in aid coordination among 
donors. This would help countries cope with the administration burden associated 
with aid flows, avoid duplication, and reduce multiplicity of conditionalities. ODA 
should be directed to low-income countries. This means increasing their productivity 
through investment in infrastructure co-financed by aid and private sector, so as to 
compensate for tax incentives for investment in disadvantaged countries, as well as 
to finance insurance for foreign investors. 
 
VII.  DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
Debt relief is needed for many poor countries and must be structured to 
complement other forms of development assistance. Developing countries have large 
debts which they cannot service. A large debt overhang entails well-known 
economic costs, induced by both illiquidity and disincentive effects. A high level of 
debt creates uncertainty about the country’s capacity to service its debt and 
discourages investment. Moreover the investors may perceive it to be a form of tax 
on future income of the country, thus dissuading investment. Accordingly, they need 
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management. As a matter of fact, this can be a major source of funding especially for 
countries whose savings move out of the country by way of debt servicing.  
The short-term employment and output costs associated with debt overhang 
can be substantial and, as such, it is beneficial to both debtors and creditors to act 
collectively to reduce the face value of debt. However, it is difficult to coordinate 
debt reduction among a large group of creditors because of the free-rider problem: 
each creditor has an incentive to refrain from offering debt relief on its own claims 
and to wait for others to do so, thereby raising the expected value of its own claims. 
If lenders interact non-cooperatively, each of them, taken individually, may in fact be 
willing to provide some debt relief although not so much as they would if they were 
not to act collectively [Helpman (1989)]. Such externalities do not, however, create a 
prima facie case for welfare-improving government intervention, in particular 
because of the well-known moral hazard problems that such an intervention creates. 
Restructuring enhances the lenders’ control over the value that they assign to a 
loan on their balance sheets.  This control itself has value.  Replacing an old loan 
with a new one, stretching out payment schedules, adjusting the interest rate, and 
even forgiving missed interest payments are all ways of maintaining the fiction that a 
loan still has the same value even though the appropriately risk-adjusted present 
value of the probable stream of payments to flow from that asset may have been 
diminished. 
As long as lenders have reason to prefer restructuring to default or mere 
inaction, borrowers have reason to do so as well.  In effect, contract terms such as 
cross-default and negative pledge clauses are a way for lenders to align borrowers’ 
interests with their own.  To the extent lenders want to see a non-performing loan 
restructured, such terms give the borrowers a reason to seeking a restructuring also. 
By participating in a formal debt restructuring, borrowers in effect reduce the 
value of what they owe but do so in an orderly way. Hence the borrower acquires not 
only a reputation for not servicing debts as promised but also, importantly, a 
reputation for participating in an orderly resolution of the resulting problem.  
The conflicting incentives of borrowers and lenders and the asymmetry of 
information that a borrower and the lenders have about the borrower’s financial 
condition and prospects create a classic moral hazard situation. Hence the need for 
mechanisms to commit borrowers to meet their obligations. In the specific setting of 
what to do when borrowers fail to meet their obligations, the obvious conflict rises 
from the inferences that future borrowers, including but not limited to those having 
difficulties at the moment, draw about the likely consequences of their own 
subsequent non-performance. Creating mechanisms that preserve or even enhance 
those presumptions, even at the cost of foregoing mutually beneficial actions in some 
specific transactions, is therefore potentially valuable. 
Official lending potentially plays a key role in questions of sovereign credit 
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conduits for their countries’ private-sector borrowers, official lending is also in effect 
available more broadly. Greater participation of the private sector is imperative to 
ensure an equitable distribution of the costs of financial crises between debtors and 
creditors, but there is no agreement yet on how to “bail in” private lenders. Measures 
such as conditionality clauses in bond contracts, standstills, and improved bank-
ruptcy legislation are desirable but not exhaustive.  Since most of the lenders are in 
the developed countries, greater transparency and supervision and regulation of 
international lenders and investors by these countries themselves are needed. 
 
VIII.    INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
A poor institutional framework is the result of a combination of under-
development in the realm of contracting and regulations, and of overly powerful 
political interest groups who have tilted the institutional balance in their favour. 
Examples of the institutions that govern transactions in financial markets are 
corporate governance arrangements, financial accounting and auditing rules, debt 
covenants, or bankruptcy procedures.  Examples of labour-market institutions are the 
tenure profile of wages, dismissal rules and procedures, or the regulations that 
govern collective action. Establishing a better linkage between the formal and the 
informal sectors with a view to developing a complementary relationship between 
them in efforts towards the mobilisation of domestic resources is an important policy 
concern [Chandavarker (1992); Caballero and Hammour (1998)].   
A perfectly competitive banking system transmits economic shocks without 
magnifying them, but an imperfectly competitive banking system responds to 
adverse shocks in ways that worsen their impact, inducing negative macroeconomic 
feedback. The presence or absence of a non-bank financial intermediary or market 
has major implications for bank soundness and for the robustness of a country’s 
financial system.   
Enhanced economic security fosters private investment and growth in 
developing countries. Based on an analysis of economic security rating for 53 
developing countries during 1984-95, it appeared that reforms to improve economic 
security in specific developing country regions to “best practices” in other 
developing country regions could raise private investment by ½ to 1 percentage point 
of GDP in the short-to-medium term. In the longer term, the payoff in real economic 
growth could be in the order of ½ to 1¼ percent a year [Callan and Thimann (1997)]. 
The results suggest that institutional reforms, including an increase in civil liberties, 
further boost private sector confidence, and reduce corruption to raise longer-term 
growth prospects. It is also evident that the political and economic environment 
affecting private investment decisions includes government leadership, external 
conflicts, corruption, rule of law, racial and ethnic tension, political terrorism, civil 
war, quality of the bureaucracy, risk of repudiation of contracts, risk of expropriation 
by government, and political rights and civil liberties [Poirson (1998)].  Indeed, A. R. Kemal  308
expropriation risks and political terrorism are the most important security factors that 
bear on economic growth. Corruption and contract repudiation also affect growth, 
but only in the long run. 
 
IX.  CONCULSION 
Pakistan’s investment levels have been in the neighbourhood of 18 percent, 
and this percentage is relatively quite low; it has fallen to the lowest level over the 
last 30 years in the last couple of years, i.e., 15 percent of GDP. No doubt, to a large 
extent, this is a reflection of the fact that respective governments have taken various 
actions that have shattered the confidence of investors. The low levels of investible 
resources have also been one of the major constraints. The main results of the present 
study, therefore, can help examine the low levels of savings within the country and 
low and declining foreign private investments for possibly meaningful policy 
changes. 
Whereas private savings of Pakistan are also low, the government savings 
have been negative for more than a decade. With a view to turning the dissavings to 
savings, the government is making an effort to reduce its fiscal deficit and to ensure 
a surplus on the current account of the budget. So far, these policies have had  little 
success. Pakistan has experimented both with an increase as well as a decrease in the 
tax rates, but public revenues as a percentage of GDP have either stagnated or fallen 
in the 1990s. Now efforts are being made to improve the tax administration for better 
compliance, and one only hopes that they are successful. However, one wonders 
whether higher levels of aggregate savings can be achieved even if the government is 
able to raise sufficient resources to finance its expenditures. If such revenue comes 
from savings rather than from consumption of the private sector, the aggregate 
savings of the economy may fail to rise. 
The major determinants of savings, as noted in Section III, include the levels 
and sustainability of per capita income, openness of international trade, favourable 
financial and corporate structure, provision of pension and provident funds, strong 
tax structure, and demographic transition. Despite the doubling of per capita income, 
the savings rates in Pakistan have ranged between 12-14 percent. Probably the 
potential for higher savings could not be realised because of the liberalised 
consumption made affordable by smuggling. 
Financial repression has also been responsible for low savings rates. The rates 
of return on deposits have been barely sufficient to offset the erosion of money due 
to high inflation rates. In recent years, the financial sector has been de-regulated, but 
due to a high proportion of defaulted loans, the rates of return on deposits remain 
low. 
The demographic transition also has been instrumental in raising the savings 
rates. The population growth rates in the 1990s have shown a tendency towards 
decline. With a fall in the dependency ratio, the savings rates are expected to rise.  Financing Economic Development  309
Whereas foreign capital is raised to increase the investment levels, on average 
only 60 percent of the capital flows has been used for investment purposes. 
Pakistan’s experience is even worse, where the impact of capital inflows on 
investment was marginal. Whenever the external aid was obtained, the government’s 
effort to mobilise resources slackened, and it even increased public consumption. It 
has generally been said that FDI is preferable to loan because while the former 
would always lead to higher investment  levels, the latter may not. This is not 
necessarily true. The capital is fungible and FDI may crowd out the domestic 
investment. 
The significance of official development assistance has declined, and that of 
foreign private investment increased. As compared to the total inflow of 20 billion 
dollars of ODA, the foreign capital inflow in the form of investment in developing 
countries has been $208 billion. No doubt, foreign private investment brings with it 
dynamic benefits such as the transfer of technology, improved management 
practices, market access, competitive lower capital, and building the market 
confidence, yet the fact remains that it may not come to the social sectors, which are 
vital to the development process of Pakistan at the present stage. Besides, if FDI is 
driven by distorted incentives, as is the case in Pakistan, or if it flows only to those 
economic activities which are non-traded, such as the IPPs and motorways, it would 
severely constrain foreign exchange resources. 
Countries like Pakistan need ODA rather badly. However, in a number of 
years in the 1990s, net ODA flows have been negative in Pakistan. The ODA 
depends on a suitable environment in an interdependent world and, therefore, a 
consistency and coherence in the approaches to development would help in using 
these resources better. There is a need to streamline aid delivery and to improve the 
quality of it, as discussed in the preceding section of this paper. It would pay if the 
sensitivities of public opinion in the donor and recipient countries are kept in view. 
Accordingly, Pakistan should come up with projects and programmes relating to 
social sectors and poverty alleviation; and the donors may watch their own side. 
Pakistan has a large debt which it finds difficult to service. The donors agreed 
to reschedule the debt in 1999, and they may agree to do so once again. But what 
Pakistan needs is debt relief rather than just debt re-scheduling. As long as heavy 
debt looms on the economic horizon, it will remain difficult to overlook the 
uncertainty about the country’s capacity to service debt and encourage investment. 
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